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The Equal Protection Clause and Imprisonment of the 
Indigent For Nonpayment of Fines 
The practice of imprisonment for failure to pay a fine levied 
for a criminal violation originated in twelfth-century England;1 its 
subsequent unanimous acceptance in the United States is manifested 
I. SUTHERLAND & CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 275 (6th ed. 1960). For an extensive dis• 
cussion of the historical development of the use of fines, see 2 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY 
OF ENGLISH LAw 43-44, 46 (3d ed. 1923); I STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
OF ENGLAND 57 (1883). 
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in the provisions in the statutes of every state2 and of the federal 
government3 authorizing imprisonment for nonpayment of fines. 
A few states not only commit the defendant to jail for nonpayment 
of the fine, but impose hard labor as well.4 Some states, however, 
have mitigated to a degree the harshness of the practice. For exam-
ple, Arizona restricts the total period of confinement for the crime 
and the default of the fine to the maximum sentence authorized for 
the substantive offense.5 In addition, the majority of states have 
statutes which ameliorate the burden upon the indigent6 by provid-
ing for the discharge of "poor" prisoners after some minimum period 
of incarceration. 7 
The greatly increased use of fines in the twentieth century has 
made imprisonment for nonpayment a prominent sanction in the 
administration of our criminal laws.8 American- courts have tradi-
tionally taken the position that such imprisonment is not a form 
of punishment for the substantive crime, but is instead a method 
of compulsion to secure payment of the fine.9 At the turn of the 
century, some courts held that statutes authorizing imprisonment 
for nonpayment of fines were valid if a fine was the sole sanction 
imposed for the crime, but invalid when the sentence for the crime 
2. E.g., Au.sKA STAT. § 12.55.010 (1962): "A judgment that the defendant pay a fine 
shall also direct that he be imprisoned until the fine is satisfied, specifying the extent 
of the imprisonment, which cannot exceed one day for every $5 of the fine." The 
variations among the state statutes are usually in the dollar amount to be credited 
against the fine for each day of confinement. See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2315 (1964); 
CAL. PEN. CODE § 1205; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.14 (Supp. 1964); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 15:529.3 (1951); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 718. 
3. 18 u.s.c. § 3565 (1964). 
4. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 341 (1958); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-7 (1953). 
5. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1648 (1956). 
6. An indigent has been defined as one who is needy and poor, or one who has not 
sufficient property to furnish a living, or anyone who is able to support him, or to 
whom he is entitled to look for support. See BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951). 
7. E.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.030 (1962); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-10-9 (1964); 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 180-6 (Smith-Hurd 1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 551.010 (1953). 
There is also a corresponding federal statute. Indigent Prisoner's Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3569 
(1964). 
8. The increased use of fines is attributed to the increased number of "minor" 
offenses. RUBIN, CRIMINAL CORRECTION 230 (1963). Although there is a lack of statistical 
data, it has been estimated that fines constitute 75% of all sentences imposed in the 
United States. Id. at 240; SUTHERLAND & CRESSEY, op. dt. supra note 1, at 276. Periodic 
studies of Philadelphia's Reed Street Prison and the Baltimore City Jail between 1940 
and 1950 indicated that approximately 60% of all persons imprisoned in those institu-
tions had been committed for nonpayment of fines. Ibid.; Note, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 
1013-14 (1953). The full magnitude of the problem is best illustrated by the fact that 
New York City, in 1960 alone, collected a record total of nearly $15 million in fines, and 
committed over 26,000 people for nonpayment. N.Y.C. MAGISTRATES' CoURTS ANN. REP. 
table 7 at 24-25, table 15 at 31 (1960). 
9. See Ex parte Vendetti, 6 Alaska 381 (4th Div. 1921); In re Sullivan, 3 Cal. App. 
193, 84 Pac. 781 (Ct. App. 1906); Mullin v. State, 38 Del. 533, 194 Atl. 578 (Super. Ct. 
1937); McKinney v. Hamilton, 282 N.Y. 393, 26 N.E.2d 949 (1940); Foertscp. v. Jameson, 
48 S.D. 328,204 N.W. 175 (1925). 
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included both fine and imprisonment.10 However, later authority 
in other states indicates that this position was merely an isolated 
exception to the general judicial acceptance of such statutes.11 The 
courts have consistently upheld the constitutionality of statutes 
authorizing imprisonment for nonpayment in the face of assertions 
that the procedure constituted a cruel and unusual punishment12 or 
amounted to imprisonment for debt.13 
The deprivation of freedom resulting from the application of 
these statutes has been most immediate and severe for the indigent 
defendant whose poverty precludes payment of any fine imposed 
upon him. This factor brings into focus the essential question 
whether the indigent is denied the equal protection of the laws 
when he is, in effect, automatically incarcerated for nonpayment of 
his fine, whereas the person of means can purchase his immediate 
release. Although this issue has not yet been presented to the United 
States Supreme Court, it has arisen in lower courts14 because of 
the Supreme Court's increasing reliance upon the equal protection 
clause to mitigate the plight of the indigent defendant.16 
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has adhered to two basic views 
as to· what amounts to a denial of equal protection. The first formed 
the basis for the decision in Brown v. Board of Education,16 in which 
the Court held that segregation of white and Negro children in 
public schools, pursuant to state statutes which permitted or required 
such segregation, denied the Negroes the equal protection guaran-
teed by the fourteenth amendment. The statutes were condemned 
not because they were unfairly administered, but because they were 
discriminatory on their face.17 
The second view was formulated by the Court in Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins,18 in which a Chinese laundryman had been denied a license 
10. People v. Brown, 113 Cal. 35, 45 Pac. 181 (1896); People v. Kerr, 15 Cal. App. 
273, 114 Pac. 584 {Ct. App. 1911); Reese v. Olsen, 44 Utah 318, 109 Pac. 941 (1914): 
Roberts v. Howells, 22 Utah 389, 62 Pac. 892 (1900). This position was justified on the 
ground that the imposition of imprisonment, in addition to a punitive jail sentence 
for a definite term, exceeded the court's power. 
11. See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 189 A.2d 132 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); Lee v. 
State, 103 Ga. App. 161, 118 S.E.2d 599 (1961); People ex rel. Crockett v. Redman, 41 
Misc. 2d 962,246 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. 1964). 
12. See, e.g., Foertsch v. Jameson, 48 S.D. 328, 204 N.W. 175 (1925). 
13. See, e.g., State v. Kilmer, 31 N.D. 442, 153 N.W. 1089 (1915); Ex parte Small, 92 
Okla. Crim. 101, 221 P.2d 669 (Crim. Ct. App. 1950); Harlow v. Clow, 110 Ore, 257, 
223 Pac. 541 (1924). 
14. United States ex rel. Privitera v. Kross, 239 F. Supp. US {S.D.N.Y. 1965); People 
v. Collins, 47 Misc. 2d 210, 261 N.Y.S.2d 970 {Orange County Ct. 1965). See generally 
notes 31-50 infra and accompanying text. 
15. See notes 21-26 infra and accompanying text. 
16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
17. See also, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State 
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
18. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
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to operate, although licenses were being granted to non-orientals: 
In holding this to be an unconstitutional denial of equal protection, 
the Court stated that even though the statute was fair on its face, 
the Constitution is violated when the law is "applied and admin-
istered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand"19 
so as to discriminate unjustly between persons in similar circum-
stances.20 
In 1956 the Court established a new equal protection standard 
in Griffin v. Illinois.21 Although_ the scope of this 4-1-4 decision22 is 
still uncertain, it is significant as the Court's first broad pronounce-
ment on economic equality in the criminal process.23 The state of 
Illinois had conditioned appeal upon the purchase of a trial trans-
cript. Although this requirement applied equally to all defendants, 
its practical effect was to deny the right of appellate review to those 
too poor to purchase a transcript. The Court rejected the contention 
that the state is never required to equalize economic disparities,24 
holding that the state's failure to provide a free transcript to ·the 
indigent violated the equal protection clause.25 In effect, the Court 
considered the statute unreasonably discriminatory because it led to 
one result for the wealthy and another for the poor, despite being 
both fair on its face and indiscriminately admii;iistered.26 
19. Id. at 373-74. 
20. See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 
U.S. 475 (1954); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953). 
21. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The Griffin case precipitated a storm of controversy. See, e.g., 
LOCKHART, KAMISAR /1,c CHOPER, CAsES ON CONSTITUTIONAL I.Aw 706-07 (1964); Allen, 
Griffin v. Illinois-Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 151 (1957); Goldberg, 
Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 205 (1964); Qua, Griffin v. Illi-
nois, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 143 (1957); Tucker, The Supreme Court and the Indigent De: 
fendant, 37 So. CAL. L. REv. 151 (1964); Willcox &: Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Pov-
erty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1957); Comment, 16 STAN. 
L. REv. 394 (1964). 
22, The principal opinion was written by Mr. Justice Black, and was joined by 
Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Clark. Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
concurred, while Justices Burton, Minton, Reed and Harlan dissented. 
23. See Goldberg, supra note 21, at 218. 
24, 351 U.S. 12, 28 (1956) (Burton and Minton, JJ., dissenting). Although there is 
no express language in the majority opiniqn that deals with this contention, the whole 
tenor of Mr. Justice Black's and Mr. Justice Frankfurter's arguments inevitably leads 
to this conclusion. See also Kamisar, Ras the Supreme Court Left the Attorney General 
Behind?-The Bazelon-Katzenbach Letters on Poverty, Equality and the Administra-
tion of Criminal Justice, 155 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 24, 1966. 
25. The holding was given added importance by Mr. Justice Black's broad state-
ment that "in criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty 
than on account of religion, race or color," 351 U.S. at 17, and that "there can be no 
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he 
has," id. at 19. 
26. The Griffin rationale was immediately utilized in several "indigent defendant" 
cases which extended it to other aspects of appeal. See Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 
(1959); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963). It was 
also extended to certain situations in which the indigent was without the assistance of 
counsel on appeal. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). The Court has even 
942 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 64 
The Court's subsequent decision in Douglas v. California,27 
which held that an indigent must not be denied the assistance of 
counsel on appeal (at least on his first appeal as of right under 
state law), effectively refutes a narrow interpretation of Griffin.28 
The view that Griffin considered only the availability of, or access 
to, appellate review must be modified or abandoned in light of 
Douglas, which made it clear that the evil in both cases-denial 
on appeal of free counsel or a free transcript-was the same: dis-
crimination against the indigent.29 
Although the force of the Griffin-Douglas rationale was such 
that one might expect it to be applied to imprisonment for nonpay-
ment of fines,30 such an extension was rejected by a federal district 
court in United States ex rel. Privitera v. Kross.31 The indigent 
defendant, upon receiving a non-maximum, sentence of thirty days 
and an additional sixty days for failure to pay a five hundred dollar 
fine, sought release from custody upon a federal ·writ of habeas 
corpus, contending that the imprisonment for nonpayment was at-
tributable solely to his lack of funds, and therefore violated his right 
to the equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment. 
The court found no violation of the equal protection clause, stating 
that since the prisoner's past criminal record and other relevant 
factors allowed the judge wide discretion in sentencing, the prisoner 
was not justified in comparing his situation with that of a wealthy 
defendant who might avoid such imprisonment by prompt payment 
of the fine.32 This analysis would seem to skirt the issue by failing 
to recognize that imprisonment for nonpayment of fines has always 
been justified only as a coercive device, never as a punishment.811 
The judge's discretion as to the use of defendant's past criminal 
record is relevant only when the sanction for the substantive crime 
is being imposed. At that time the record may influence the decision 
heard argument on whether an indigent state defendant has a constitutional right to 
be furnished with the services of an independent psychiatrist, Bush v. Texas, 372 U.S. 
586 (1963), but consideration of the constitutional issue was postponed when the state 
agreed to a retrial. 
27. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
28. See Kamisar &: Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota-Some Field Find• 
ings and Legal Policy Observations, 48 MINN, L. REv. I, 12 (1963). 
29. Ibid. 
30. See Wildeblood v. United States, 284 F.2d 592, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Edgerton, J., 
dissenting). Judge Edgerton strongly objected to imprisonment for nonpayment as being 
unfairly discriminatory against the poor. Since the defendant in Wildeblood was not 
imprisoned for nonpayment, the majority found it unnecessary to pass on the issue 
raised by the dissent. In avoiding the issue, however, the majority implicitly approved 
earlier decisions upholding imprisonment for nonpayment. See also Goldberg, supra 
note 21, at 221-22. 
31. 239 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
32. Id. at 120. 
33. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. See also Henderson v. United States, 
189 A.2d 132 (D.C. Ct. App. 1963); Lee v. State, 103 Ga. App. 161, 118 S.E.2d 599 (1961). 
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. 
whether to impose a fine, imprisonment, or both. However, these 
considerations have no applicability as a justification for imprison-
ment for nonpayment once the appropriate sanction is determined. 
Thus, the Privitera court erred in placing imprisonment for non-
payment of a fine on a parity with incarceration for the substantive 
offense. 
The court in Privitera noted that the right pursued by the 
defendant was in fact illusory, since on remand the judge, knowing 
of the defendant's indigency, could avoid the equal protection prob-
lem by simply imposing a proportionately longer term of confine-· 
ment as punishment for the crime, instead of imposing a fine and 
then requiring imprisonment for nonpayment.34 The judge's dis-
cretion in this setting is limited, however, by the maximum period 
of imprisonment prescribed by the statute punishing the substantive 
offense. The constitutional issue is therefore most directly presented 
where the maximum term of imprisonment has already _been im-
posed, and the defendant is required to remain incarcerated for an 
additional period because of his inability to pay the fine.35 
Precisely the problem just described was presented in People 
v. Collins.36 Defendant Collins was convicted of third degree assault 
and received the maximum sentence-one year in jail and a $250 
fine. Since he was unable to pay the fine, he was further sentenced 
to one day in jail for every dollar of the fine unpaid. The defendant 
appealed, alleging that the additional imprisonment beyond the stat-
utory maximum was unconstitutional as to him because he was 
unable to pay any fine imposed. The court held that this additional 
imprisonment discriminated between an indigent and a non-indi-
gent, and therefore violated the equal protection clause.37 Relying 
on a rationale similar to that of the Griffin decision, the court based 
its holding on two grounds. The first was that the legislative purpose 
underlying the statute imposing imprisonment for nonpayment-en-
forcing payment of the fine-was not being furthered when applied 
to an indigent. It seems obvious that depriving the accused of his 
liberty could not possibly have coerced payment of a fine he was in-
capable of paying, and would necessarily prevent the defendant from 
earning money with which to pay the fine. Thus, the statute appears 
to be justifiable only when applied to the defendant who has the 
funds, but simply refuses to pay; othenvise the defendant is in effect 
imprisoned for being poor. Second, the' court reasoned that the 
34. United States ex rel. Privitera v. Kross, 239 F. Supp. 118, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
35. This situation was expressly distinguished by the court in Privitera from the 
facts before it. Id. at 121. There may be justification for retaining the "$10 or 10 days" 
type of penalty, since abolition of this sanction would mean that the offender would go 
unpunished. ' 
36. 47 Misc. 2d 210, 261 N.Y.S.2d 970 (Orange County Ct. 1965). 
37. Id. at 213, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 973. 
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wealthy defendant has an undue advantage in that he is able to limit 
the duration of his confinement to the maximum period set by statute 
for the substantive crime, while the indigent, given the same prison 
term and fine, is incarcerated regardless of his desire to pay. In fact, 
the indigent may find himself in the anomalous situation of being 
imprisoned longer for nonpayment of the fine than the maximum 
statutory period set for tlie substantive offense.88 In Collins, as in 
Griffin, the consequence of the statute was discrimination between 
rich and poor, even though it was equally administered and fair 
on its face. 
Although the court in Collins found imprisonment of the indi-
gent defendant to be a denial of equal protection, it held that the 
defendant was nevertheless accountable for the fine, and that the 
state could take whatever action was otherwise available to collect 
it.89 In this the court was clearly correct, since failure to take this 
position would have enabled the indigent to avoid both the fine 
and imprisonment for nonpayment, whereas the wealthy defendant 
must always, upon conviction, suffer one or the other. The result 
would have be~n the same discrimination against the wealthy that 
the court found intolerable when directed against the poor. 
An area closely analogous to imprisonment for nonpayment of 
fines is the imposition of bail as a prerequisite to pretrial release. 
In ea~h instance, the indigent is denied his freedom because he does 
not have sufficient funds to pay for it. In concluding that no man 
should be denied release because of his indigency, Mr. Justice 
Douglas, sitting as a circuit judge, has advocated release despite non-
payment of bail when other factors indicate that the indigent will 
comply with the court's orders.40 The law of bail, like that of impris-
onment for nonpayment of fines', has been considered fertile soil 
for the extension of the Griffin-Douglas rationale.41 However, it 
would be presumptuous to assume that this doctrine will easily ac-
commodate the inequities in the areas of bail and imprisonment for 
nonpayment of fines. When the criminal process is viewed in the 
symmetry of its step-by-step gradations, it is apparent that the 
Griffin-Douglas rationale was concerned specifically with the in-
38. This would have been the situation in Collins if the fine had exceeded $365, 
Although the prisoner in Privitera did not receive the maximum sentence for the crime, 
he spent twice as long in jail for nonpayment of the fine as for the substantive offense 
(30 days for the crime and 60 days for nonpayment). See generally Davidson, Tiu: 
Promiscuous Fine, 8 CRIM. L.Q. 74 (1965) (Canada); 123 J.P. 248 (1959) (London). 
39. People v. Collins, 47 Misc. 2d 210, 213, 261 N.Y.S.2d 970, 974 (Orange County Ct. 
1965). 
40. Bandy v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 11 (1961). 
41. Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565, 568 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (dictum). See also Foote, 
The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 959, 1125 (1965); Kennedy, 
Judidal Administration-Fair and Equal Treatment to All Before the Law, 28 VITAL 
SPEECHES 706 (1962); 113 U. PA. L. REv. 774 (1965). 
March 1966] Notes 945 
equities in the actual process of determining guilt or innocenc~-the 
trial and appeal stage. On the other hand, the imposition of bail 
occurs prior to the commencement of that stage, and the imprison-
ment for nonpayment of a fine occurs subsequent to the termination 
of that stage. In either case, if the indigent is to invoke the aid of 
Griffin and Douglas, he must bring about an extension of that doc-
trine to steps in the criminal process not at present encompassed 
by it. Such an extension to the problem of imprisonment for non-
payment of fines, however, would seem to be justified in view of the 
_fact that society's interest in the accused now often virtually dissolves 
after conviction, along with the judicial system's emphasis on pro-
cedures for fairness and equality.42 
Opponents of the Supreme Court decisions extending broad 
rights to indigent defendants have argued that these decisions fre-
quently place an undue financial burden upon the state.43 However, 
such objections are untenable in cases involving imprisonment for 
nonpayment of fines. In fact, the state may actually benefit financially 
by ·not incarcerating those who are unable to pay. The 1960 report 
of the New York State Commission of Correction estimated the daily 
per capita cost of imprisonment to be between $3.60 and $7.93.44 
Since in almost every state the fine is discharged after the period 
of imprisonment for nonpayment, the state not only loses the reve-
nue from the fine, but also incurs the burden of paying for the pris-
oner's incarceration. On the other hand, insistence on the eventual 
payment of the fine, without incarceration for nonpayment, relieves 
the state of the prisoner's upkeep, and allows for the possibility 
of collecting the fine at some later date, a practical consideration 
which reinforces the result reached in Collins. 
In response to a decision like People v. Collins, the state legis-
lature must formulate a statutory scheme which enables the indigent 
to receive the equal treatment to which he is entitled. The most 
obvious possibility would be to eliminate fines altogether, punish-
ing only by imprisonment. Since a one hundred dollar fine is no 
deterrent to a man with means, while it is a genuine burden upon 
the indigent, abolition of the fine might theoretically· be an easy 
method of achieving equality.45 As a practical matter, however, this 
42. See Silving, Inconsistencies in Present Criminal Procedure, in EssA.vs ON 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 354-56 (1964). 
43. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 509 (1963) (White, J., dissenting); Griffin 
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 34 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
, 44. STATE CoMM'N OF CORRECTION ANN. REP. 66-67 (New York 1960). A figure of 
$4.56 has been submitted as the daily per capita cost of the Detroit House of Correction. 
MICH. CORRECTIONS CoMM'N REP. (1961). 
45. There has been considerable doubt expressed as to the effectiveness of fines as 
a penal sanction. See generally Barrett, The Role of Fines in the Administration of 
Criminal Justice in Massachusetts, 48 MAss. L.Q. 435 (1963); Davidson, supra note 38; 
Note, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1013 (1953). 
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is an untenable solution, for several reasons. First, fines have become 
an important source of government revenue.40 Second, there may be 
instances where neither the offense committed nor the offender's past 
record justifies imprisonment, but may warrant a fine. Third, the 
exclusive use of incarceration as a punishment for crime would work 
an inverse discrimination, since the imprisonment of an employed 
man of means would nearly always impose a much more severe 
burden upon him than that imposed upon an unemployed indigent 
imprisoned for the same offense. 
A much more feasible solution is to allow the indigent to pay 
his fine in installments, through a job either with the state or in 
private industry.47 Under such a plan, a standard percentage of the 
defendant's weekly or monthly income could be directly remitted 
by his employer to the state.48 If the defendant "jumped" his fine, 
he might then be imprisoned for failure to pay.40 Another solution 
might be to give the indigent exactly what he was previously denied 
-the right to elect between paying the fine and going to jail. If he 
elected to pay the fine, the installment system of payment could 
be invoked. On the other hand, if the indigent elected jail, as some 
undoubtedly would, he would do so of his own free choice. However, 
such an election might be rendered meaningless for the person who 
is so poor and unemployable 'that it would not conceivably be pos-
sible for him to satisfy the obligation of periodic payments. To meet 
this problem, the relevant statute might empower the court to assign 
such a person to the custody of the appropriate welfare and social 
authorities of the state. This custodial release would not only offer 
the possibility of enabling the indigent ultimately to satisfy his 
pecuniary obligation to the state, but would also offer significant 
opportunities for rehabilitation. Another method which may suc-
cessfully avoid the "equal protection" attack is the limitation in the 
Arizona statute50 which forbids imprisonment in any case beyond 
the maximum period prescribed for the crime. Although these sug-
gestions do not exhaust th_e possible solutions, they are indicative 
46. N.Y.C. MAGISTRATES' COURTS ANN. REP., op. cit. supra note 8; RUBIN, op. cit, 
supra note 8, at 230; Note, 101 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1013, 1026 (1953). 
47. Some states already have provisions allowing such installment payments. CAL. 
PEN. CODE§ 1205; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § IA (1956); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 953 
(1964): S.C. CoDE ANN. § 55-593 (1962); UTAH Com, ANN. § 77-35-17 (1953); Wis. 
STAT. § 57.04 (Supp. 1965). 
48. A similar provision is under consideration in relation to a state automobile 
insurance fund. If the state is required to pay money out of the central fund, the 
negligent driver who caused the accident would be allowed to reimburse the fund 
through installment payments, measured by a percentage of weekly or monthly income. 
Ann Arbor Conference on Auto Insurance, Sept. 15-16, 1965 (Remarks of Michigan 
Secretary of State James Hare) (unpublished report in Michigan Law School Library). 
-49. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:166-15 (1953). 
50. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. 
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of the type of reform that is necessary. Probably the greatest barrier 
to effective legislative reform in this area is the idea that what is 
accepted is what is right. Imprisonment for nonpayment has been 
accepted for so many years that it is considered to be an integral 
part of our system of criminal justice. 
Besides exposing the inequities of imprisonment for nonpayment 
of fines, the decision in People v. Collins potentially endangers the 
constitutionality of every state statute permitting such confinement 
in the case of the indigent. It is probable that the doctrine of the 
case will be applied only in circumstances where the maximum 
period of confinement for the substantive crime has been imposed; 
nevertheless, its rationale indicates progress in the effort to make 
equal justice a reality to all persons regardless of wealth . 
., 
